Reader Ross Nordeen has brought to my, and hence your, attention an interesting column in the St. Petersburg Times on “The Competing Philosophies Over Affirmative Action.” It’s worth reading, especially because Nordeen describes the author, Robyn Blumner, as “nominally a liberal.” I agree that it’s worth reading — and also that she’s probably a liberal because, as you’ll see below, she uses a noun as a verb as liberals are wont to do.
It’s a good column, but I do have a couple of small nits to pick with it. Take the following division:
The left unapologetically believes that slavery and other past wrongs have to be rectified by artificially advantaging [sic] the racial heirs of those who suffered. The other side says it isn’t fair to punish white and Asian students who never discriminated, by essentially keeping them from competing for a chunk of incoming class seats.
This distinction is not false, but it is incomplete and at least somewhat misleading.
First, as a legal matter, the courts have pretty much eliminated compensation for past wrongs as a justification for racial preference (except for actual victims). The compensation argument still of course has a moral, and hence a rhetorical, appeal, but it is very seldom argued in court any more.
Second, the deepest critics of preferences tend to regard the unfairness of the burdens placed on “white and Asian students who never discriminated” as secondary, deriving from a more fundamental violation of the underlying core value of American society that all people should be treated without regard to their race or religion. Life is full of undeserved punishments, but punishing people for their race or religion violates perhaps the central tenet in what Gunnar Myrdal and others have called the American Creed, and so is even more disturbing than the unfairness it inflicts on the particular individuals.
Similarly, Blumner quotes with approval Stephen Hicks, chairman of the philosophy dept. at Rockford College, who says
those who support racial preferences embrace notions of collectivism, altruism, social determinism and equality, while those opposed are disposed to concepts of individualism, egoism, individual volition and liberty.
Again, this isn’t so much wrong as incomplete. All proponents of preferences aren’t collectivists or even altruists, and it is a mistake to grant preferentialists monopoly control over the concept of equality. Similarly, all critics are not at the extreme of individualism/egoism that this quote implies, nor do they all embrace unrestrained liberty.
There is indeed a tension between equality and liberty, especially when equality is thought to mean equality of condition. The characteristically American solution to this tension is the concept of equality of opportunity, which draws on both equality and liberty. In practical terms, debates usually occur over how much state intervention is required to “level the playing field,” and how much collective responsibility to take for the clear and persistent losers.
But that’s just my take. You should go read the column.
